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ARE CERTAIN CREDITORS TOO BIG (OR
IMPORTANT) TO FAIL?
INTRODUCTION
The most recent financial crisis, which produced the worst recession
since the Great Depression, affected financial markets both in the United
States and abroad.1 The financial crisis has been attributed to many
causes—chief among them, the deregulation of the financial markets,
subprime mortgage lending, and securitization of complex and opaque
financial products.2 One of the most notable and widely criticized responses
to the financial crisis was the government-sponsored bailout3 of financial
institutions.4 In the years preceding the crisis, many financial institutions,
such as Bear Sterns5 and Lehman Brothers,6 had grown so large and
interconnected that their collapse would have had a catastrophic effect on
the U.S. financial markets, thereby coining the phrase “too big to fail”
(TBTF).7 The federal government viewed current insolvency regimes as an

1. See DICK K. NANTO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34742, THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL
CRISIS: ANALYSIS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 2 (2009), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs
/misc/RL34742.pdf; Martin Neil Baily & Douglas J. Elliott, The US Financial and Economic
Crisis: Where Does It Stand and Where Do We Go From Here?, BROOKINGS (June 2009),
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2009/0615_economic_crisis_baily_elliott/0615
_economic_crisis_baily_elliott.pdf.
2. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Statement before
the Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm’n: Causes of the Recent Financial and Economic Crisis (Sept. 2,
2010), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/bernanke20100902a.pdf
[hereinafter Causes of the Recent Financial and Economic Crisis].
3. A bailout is a rescue from financial distress. During the recent financial crisis, the Federal
Reserve implemented a bailout program by using its emergency lending authority under § 13(3) of
the Federal Reserve Act. AIG is an example of such a bailout program. See Scott G. Alvarez,
General Counsel, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Testimony before the Cong.
Oversight Panel: Government Assistance to AIG (May 26, 2010), available at
NEW
http://federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/alvarez20100526a.pdf;
WEBSTER’S
UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 140 (2d ed. 1983).
4. John C. Coffee, Jr., Systemic Risk After Dodd-Frank: Contingent Capital and the Need for
Regulatory Strategies Beyond Oversight, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 797 (2011).
5. Bear Sterns was an investment bank, and a securities and trading brokerage company. The
company collapsed in 2008 and was subsequently sold in a “fire sale” to JPMorgan in a deal
facilitated by the Federal Reserve. Andrew Ross Sorkin & Landon Thomas Jr., JPMorgan Acts to
Buy Ailing Bear Stearns at Huge Discount, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com
/2008/03/16/business/16cnd-bear.html?scp=2&sq=bear%20stearns&st=Search.
6. Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. was the fourth-largest investment bank in the United
States before it filed for Chapter 11 protection under the Bankruptcy Code on September 15, 2008.
The Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy is the largest bankruptcy in the history of the United States,
involving over 100,000 unsecured creditors and $613 billion in debt. See Sam Mamudi, Lehman
Folds with Record $613 Billion Debt, MARKETWATCH (Sept. 15, 2008, 10:11 AM) http://www
.marketwatch.com/story/lehman-folds-with-record-613-billion-debt?siteid=rss; Barclays Buys
Core Lehman Assets, BBC NEWS, Sept. 17, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business
/7620306.stm.
7. “A too-big-to-fail firm is one whose size, complexity and interconnectedness, and critical
functions are such that, should the firm go unexpectedly into liquidation, the rest of the financial
system and the economy would face severe adverse consequences.” Causes of the Recent
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inadequate response to address the failure of a TBTF financial institution.8
Consequently, “financial support for [these] compan[ies] sometimes was
the only viable option . . . to avoid or mitigate serious adverse effects on
economic conditions and financial stability . . . .”9 In furtherance of this
solution, Congress established the Troubled Asset Relief Program
(TARP),10 which allowed the Department of the Treasury (the Treasury
Department) to inject capital into failing institutions and purchase their
distressed assets.11
In 2010, in response to the crisis, Congress passed the most sweeping
financial reform regulation of the past seventy years—the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank).12 Dodd-Frank
was implemented to address the regulatory gaps that exacerbated the
financial crisis by: imposing stricter regulations on financial institutions,
regulating particular financial products that were previously unregulated,13
and creating an adequate system for liquidating TBTF institutions.14 These
laws were structured in an effort to eliminate systemic risk15 and minimize

Financial and Economic Crisis, supra note 2, at 20–23; see also Reza Dibadj, Four Key Elements
To Successful Financial Regulatory Reform, 6 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 377, 389–90 (2010).
8. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Implementing Certain Orderly Liquidation Authority
Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 75 Fed. Reg.
64,173, 64,174 (proposed Oct. 19, 2010) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 380) [hereinafter Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking].
9. Id.
10. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA), Pub. L. N. 110-343, 122 Stat.
3765 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
11. At the request of the Treasury Department, Congress enacted the EESA to effectively bail
out TBTF institutions. Id. § 5201 et seq.; Greg Hitt, Damian Paletta & Deborah Solomon,
Lawmakers Battle Over Rescue Plan, WALL ST. J., Sept. 22, 2008, http://online.wsj.com/article
/SB122200573768460503.html. The EESA allowed the Treasury Department to use up to $700
billion to inject capital into failing institutions and purchase their distressed assets through TARP.
EESA, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5211–5241.
12. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
13. Dodd-Frank will now regulate over-the-counter derivatives (once a primarily unregulated
financial market), which will be enforced by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. Regulatory Practice Letter, KPMG, Dodd-Frank
Act: Regulation of Over-the-Counter Derivatives (Title VII) (Aug. 10, 2010), available at
http://www.us.kpmg.com/microsite/RegulatoryPractice/2010/rpl-1013-otc-derivatives.pdf.
14. See Dodd-Frank Act § 206, 124 Stat. 1459 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5386); U.S. S. COMM.
ON BANKING, HOUS. & URBAN AFFAIRS, BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET
REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT (2010), available at http://banking.senate.gov
/public/_files/070110_Dodd_Frank_Wall_Street_Reform_comprehensive_summary_Final.pdf.
15. Although there is no single definition for systemic risk, Steven L. Schwarcz states,
A common factor in the various definitions of systemic risk is that a trigger event,
such as an economic shock or institutional failure, causes a chain of bad economic
consequences—sometimes referred to as a domino effect. . . .
....
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moral hazard16 in an orderly and transparent manner.17 Dodd-Frank,
specifically Title II, created the Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA),18
which grants the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)19 the
authority to act as receiver20 and wind down bank holding companies21 and
nonbank financial companies,22 which pose a significant risk.23 This is to
ensure that creditors and shareholders, and not the U.S. taxpayers, will
sustain the loss of the financial company.24 To address the widespread
public contempt over the bailouts, Title II also prohibits the FDIC from
taking an equity interest in or becoming a shareholder of a failing financial
company.25
The OLA is a hybrid model26 of two existing insolvency regimes—the
Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDIA)27 and the Bankruptcy Code (the

The classic example of systemic risk in this context is a “bank run,” in which the
inability of a bank to satisfy withdrawal-demands causes its failure, in turn causing
other banks or their creditors to fail.
Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 196, 198–99 (2008). As such, the federal
government anticipated that if complex financial institutions failed, U.S. financial markets could
experience catastrophic harm. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 75 Fed. Reg. 64,173, 64,174
(proposed Oct. 19, 2010) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 380).
16. Moral hazard results when a party who is protected from risk (i.e., a bailout recipient) fails
to take the same precautions as a party who is not protected under the bailout regime. Kenneth
Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy or Bailouts?, 35 J. CORP. L. 469, 485 (2010).
17. See Dodd-Frank Act § 204, 124 Stat. 1454 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5384); U.S. S. COMM.
ON BANKING, HOUS. & URBAN AFFAIRS, BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET
REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT (2010), available at http://banking.senate.gov/public
/_files/070110_Dodd_Frank_Wall_Street_Reform_comprehensive_summary_Final.pdf.
18. Dodd-Frank Act § 204(a), 124 Stat. 1454 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5384).
19. The FDIC is an independent federal agency that monitors and provides insurance for bank
and thrift institutions’ deposits to limit the adverse impact that institutional failure would have on
the U.S. economy. FDIC, Who is the FDIC? (Aug. 11, 2010), http://www.fdic.gov/about
/learn/symbol/.
20. The FDIC, as receiver, has the power to liquidate a financial company’s assets in a manner
it deems appropriate. Dodd-Frank Act § 210(a), 124 Stat. 1460 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5390).
21. A bank holding company includes a company which has control over a bank, or a company
that has control over another company that is or may become a bank holding company. 12 U.S.C.
§ 1841(a)(1) (2006); Dodd-Frank Act § 102(a)(1), 124 Stat. 1391 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5311).
22. A nonbank financial company has been defined as a U.S. or foreign nonbank financial
company that is “predominantly engaged in financial activities.” Dodd-Frank Act § 102(a)(4), 124
Stat. 1391 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5311). This includes companies in which 85 percent of its
annual gross revenues or consolidated assets are derived from financial activities. Id. § 102(a)(6).
23. Significant risk institutions are nonbank financial companies that the Board of Governors
determines will pose a systemic risk to the financial markets. Id. §§ 102(a)(7), 113(a).
24. Id. § 204(a).
25. Id. § 206(6). See also Sheila C. Bair, Chairman, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Statement before
the Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm’n: Systemically Important Institutions and the Issue of “Too Big to
Fail” (Sept. 2, 2010) [hereinafter Systemically Important Institutions].
26. Jenna Greene, FDIC’s New Power to Dissolve Companies Raises Concerns, NAT’L L.J.
(ONLINE) (Sept. 7, 2010), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202471686189 [hereinafter
FDIC’s New Power].
27. See 12 U.S.C. § 1811 et seq. (2006).
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Code).28 Under the FDIA, the FDIC has similar authority as receiver to
wind down failing depository institutions.29 Analogous provisions of the
Code, such as preferential transfers and fraudulent conveyances, were also
included in order to supplement and clarify the authority of the FDIC.30
Under the OLA, the FDIC is granted wide discretion as receiver to
carry out Title II’s objectives—the most important being, mitigating
systemic risk and moral hazard. This discretion includes the ability to pay
certain unsecured creditors before others that are similarly situated, which
has raised substantial concern.31 Although concern may be warranted, the
ability to treat similarly situated creditors differently is not a novel idea.32 In
fact, it is a controversial principle, known as the doctrine of necessity.33
The doctrine of necessity is a common law rule that allows a debtor to
pay certain pre-petition unsecured claims before others that would normally
be subject to a distribution pursuant to § 507 of the Code,34 or a
confirmation plan in a Chapter 11 reorganization case.35 In some instances,
the payments of certain unsecured claims are allowed if the creditor is
deemed to be a “critical vendor.”36 The rationale for payment has been that
paying certain critical vendors will allow the business to continue, thereby
benefitting all creditors by maximizing the value of assets.37 Courts are split
as to the application and use of the doctrine because of the potential for
abuse of judicial discretion and the possibility that select creditors’
distributions will be altered arbitrarily.38
In order to avoid controversial critical vendor issues and to create a
more transparent system, the FDIC promulgated a rule, which clarified how
it intends to exercise its authority regarding additional payments (the Final
28. See 11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (2006); Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 75 Fed. Reg. 64,173,
64,174–75 (proposed Oct. 19, 2010) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 380).
29. 12 U.S.C. § 1822.
30. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 75 Fed. Reg. at 64,175 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt.
380).
31. See id.; FDIC’s New Power, supra note 26; Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 210(b)(4), 124 Stat. 1376, 1476 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5390 (2010)).
32. In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 98 B.R. 174, 175–176 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989) (citing
Miltenberger v. Logansport, C. & S.W. R. Co., 106 U.S. 286 (1882)).
33. See id.; Miltenberger, 106 U.S. 286; Alan N. Resnick, The Future of the Doctrine of
Necessity and Critical-Vendor Payments in Chapter 11 Cases, 47 B.C. L. REV. 183, 187–88
(2005).
34. 11 U.S.C. § 507 (2006).
35. Resnick, supra note 33, at 183.
36. Critical vendors offer a “unique product or special relationship with the debtor” that makes
them indispensible in order to maximize the value of the assets. Therefore, pre-petition payments
are permitted to maintain the business relationship between vendor and debtor, notwithstanding
the adequate stay of § 362. Lynn P. Harrison, III & James V. Drew, First Day Orders: A Survey of
Critical Vendor Motions and Recent Developments, in BANKRUPTCY & REORGANIZATIONS:
CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 2011, at 341 (PLI On Demand Web Program Ser. No. 28454) (2009).
37. See Resnick, supra note 33, at 185–86.
38. See Russell A. Eisenberg & Frances F. Gecker, The Doctrine of Necessity and Its
Parameters, 73 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 27–37 (1989); Resnick, supra note 33, at 189–203.
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Rule).39 Although the Final Rule elucidated the FDIC’s treatment toward
unsecured creditors, it was primarily directed at long-term creditors and
failed to address short-term creditors. The FDIC’s decision to omit shortterm creditors from the Final Rule indicates that certain creditors may be
too big or important to fail. This note does not dispute the fact that under
certain circumstances, when time is of the essence, it may be necessary to
treat certain creditors more favorably than others in order to limit systemic
risk to the financial markets. The reduction of systemic risk, however, can
still be achieved while incorporating other important goals of Title II as
well. Thus, the purpose of this note is to offer a standard by which the FDIC
should determine whether a short-term creditor is necessary to the failing
financial company. This standard would have the effect of promoting
transparency within a newly created liquidation regime, minimizing moral
hazard among short-term creditors, maximizing the assets of the failing
financial company, harmonizing the OLA with existing insolvency regimes,
and maintaining FDIC flexibility.
Part I will describe the FDIC’s Final Rule and the aspects of Title II
that it sought to clarify. Part II will explain the origins of the doctrine of
necessity and analyze the various approaches taken by courts today. Part III
will explain the rationale behind the creation of the OLA compared to other
alternatives, and its mandated and overarching objectives. Part IV will
critique the FDIC’s decision to omit short-term creditors from the Final
Rule. Finally, Part V will recommend that the FDIC adopt a clear standard
by which it could determine a critical short-term creditor, which would
create a more transparent and efficient insolvency regime.
I. SECTION 210 AND THE FDIC’S FINAL RULE
Dodd-Frank, although over 800 pages in length, operates more as a
skeletal framework than a definitive set of rules.40 A majority of the
legislation grants authority to the various governmental agencies to create
rules and regulations as each agency sees fit.41 Specifically, § 209 of Title II
authorizes the FDIC, in consultation with the Financial Stability Oversight
39. The Final Rule was adopted after the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and an Interim Rule.
Both solicited comments and suggestions from various business organizations and private parties.
Certain Orderly Liquidation Authority Provisions under Title II of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,626 (July 15, 2011) (codified at 12 C.F.R.
pt. 380.27) [hereinafter Final Rule]. See also Orderly Liquidation Authority Provisions of the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 4,207 (proposed Jan.
25, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 380) [hereinafter Interim Rule]; Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 75 Fed. Reg. 64,173 (proposed Oct. 19, 2010) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 380).
40. David S. Huntington, Corporate Governance, Executive Compensation and Dodd-Frank,
BLOOMBERG LAW SEMINAR (Nov. 10, 2010).
41. See Ronald D. Orol, Fed: No Controversy on Dodd-Frank Rules, MARKETWATCH (Sept.
30, 2010, 1:01 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/oversight-panel-to-eye-risky-financialfirms-2010-09-30 (noting that the Federal Reserve must write more than fifty rules on DoddFrank, while the SEC must write more than 100).
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Council (FSOC),42 to promulgate rules that both agencies determine are
necessary or appropriate for an efficient liquidation.43 In addition, these
rules seek to complement current insolvency regimes that would otherwise
apply absent the OLA.44 The objective of this delegation is to “provide
guidance on certain key issues in order to provide clarity and certainty to
the financial industry” as well as comply with Title II’s “mandate of
transparency” during the receivership process.45 Following these guidelines,
the FDIC issued the Final Rule in July 2011, which clarified how the FDIC
would exercise its discretionary authority regarding additional payments to
unsecured creditors.46
The authority to make additional payments and treat creditors of the
same class differently was delegated to the FDIC under § 210(b)(4) of
Dodd-Frank. This authority, if exercised, would have the effect of altering
the priority structure,47 which mandates the payment distributions of
unsecured claims.48 Many commentators have criticized the implementation
of this authority because it grants the FDIC too much discretion, and as a
consequence, market participants will have no way to predict how the FDIC
will act.49 Thus, the FDIC has clarified how it intends to implement its
discretion. The Final Rule excludes certain creditors that the FDIC has
determined should not receive additional payment because they are not
necessary to maximize the value of the failing company’s assets.50 The four
categories of creditors that have been excluded are: “[h]olders of long-term
senior debt who have a claim entitled to priority of payment at the level”51

42. FSOC was created under Dodd-Frank, and is responsible for detecting and responding to
systemic threats to the U.S. financial system, while promoting market discipline. Financial
Stability Oversight Council, U.S. DEPT. OF TREAS., http://www.treas.gov/FSOC (last visited Oct.
6, 2011).
43. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 209, 124 Stat. 1376, 1460 (2010) (codified at 12
U.S.C. § 5389 (2010)).
44. Id.
45. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 75 Fed. Reg. 64,173, 64,173, 64,177 (proposed Oct. 19,
2010) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 380).
46. Id. at 64,181; Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,626 (July 15, 2011) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt.
380.27).
47. Dodd-Frank Act § 210(b)(1), 124 Stat. 1475 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5390).
48. The priorities set forth under § 210(b)(1) of Dodd-Frank define the order in which
unsecured claims are paid to each creditor class. The ability to authorize payment of certain
unsecured claims over others would alter mandated priorities and act as an exception to the rule.
Id. § 210(b)(1), (4).
49. See, e.g., Letter from Comm. on Capital Mkts. Reg. to Robert E. Feldman, Exec. Sec’y
(Nov. 15, 2010), available at http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/2010.11.15_FDIC_letter.pdf.
50. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 75 Fed. Reg. at 64,177 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt.
380).
51. Long-term senior debt has been defined as
debt issued by the covered financial company to bondholders or other creditors that has
a term of more than 360 days. It does not include partially funded, revolving or other
open lines of credit that are necessary to continuing operations essential to the
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of general or senior liability; “[h]olders of subordinated debt” to general
creditors;52 “[s]hareholders, members, general partners, limited partners, or
other persons”;53 and “[o]ther holders of claims” of general or senior
liability.54 The Final Rule was adopted to put these creditors on notice that
they “will not receive additional payments compared to other general
creditors . . . .”55 These categories can be subject to change, however, if by a
vote of its Board of Directors, the FDIC determines that additional
payments are needed.56
Although the Final Rule aimed to clarify the exercise of the FDIC’s
discretion regarding additional payments, it omitted an important class of
creditors. The Final Rule failed to include any standard or framework in
which the FDIC will determine how the creditors that are not per se
excluded (i.e., short-term creditors) will be deemed necessary to the
liquidation. As a result, this gap poses the same question that has troubled
courts when considering whether to apply the doctrine of necessity: how
does one determine a creditor’s necessity?57
II. OVERVIEW OF THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY
Granting the FDIC authority to make additional payments and
circumvent the priority scheme is not a novel concept. In bankruptcy, it is
known as the doctrine of necessity. The doctrine of necessity recognizes
that judicial authority exists to allow a debtor to pay certain pre-petition
unsecured creditors because payment is essential to the debtor’s continued
operation.58 These creditors are also known as “critical vendors” because
they generally have an unparalleled relationship with the debtor that makes
them indispensible in order to maximize the value of the assets.59 The
doctrine is quite controversial and is exercised differently depending on the
jurisdiction.60 In order to understand the implications of the FDIC’s
favorable treatment of certain creditors, it is necessary to briefly review the
receivership or any bridge financial company, nor to any contracts to extend credit
enforced by the receiver under 12 U.S.C. § 5390(c)(13)(D).
Id. at 64,181; Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 41,644 (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 380.27).
52. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 75 Fed. Reg. at 64,181 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt.
380); Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 41,644 (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 380.27).
53. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 75 Fed. Reg. at 64,181 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt.
380); Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 41,644 (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 380.27).
54. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 75 Fed. Reg. at 64,181 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt.
380); Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 41,644 (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 380.27).
55. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 75 Fed. Reg. at 64,177 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt.
380).
56. Id. at 64,181; Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 41,644 (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 380.27).
57. See Joseph Gilday, “Critical” Error: Why Essential Vendor Payments Violate the
Bankruptcy Code, 11 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 411, 419 (2003).
58. See Resnick, supra note 33, at 183–84.
59. See Harrison & Drew, supra note 36, at 341.
60. See Eisenberg & Gecker, supra note 38, at 27–37; Resnick, supra note 33, at 189–203.
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common law origins of the doctrine of necessity and its disparate
application by courts today.
A. RAILROADS AND BEYOND: COMMON LAW ORIGINS OF THE
DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY
The doctrine of necessity was originally set forth in Miltenberger v.
Logansport Railway in 1882. In Miltenberger, the Supreme Court allowed
the payment of certain pre-receivership claims against the debtor-railroad in
order to avert threatened supply and exchange stoppages.61 The Supreme
Court held “that a court has the authority to grant an equity receiver
discretion to pay preexisting debts ‘necessary and indispensible’ to the
continued operation of the business as part of the receiver’s general duty to
protect and preserve property under their charge.”62 The “Necessity of
Payment Rule,” as it became known, quickly cemented itself in the railroad
context and was routinely applied.63
The first extension beyond the railroad context where a court allowed
the debtor to pay pre-petition debts was in Dudley v. Mealey.64 In Dudley,
however, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals did not justify its decision on
the Necessity of Payment Rule or Miltenberger, but rather on the “Six
Months Rule.”65 The court allowed a debtor-hotel to pay certain prereceivership suppliers, whose debts arose six months before the petition
date, and justified the payment by the benefit to all creditors.66 The Second
Circuit articulated that in order to protect the secured creditors, it might be
necessary to pay unsecured creditors in order to continue the relationship.67
Although the doctrine of necessity (or its predecessor, the Necessity of
Payment Rule) was never mentioned in Dudley, courts still use the decision
as justification to permit payment of pre-petition claims in order to protect
creditors’ interests and better facilitate reorganization outside the railroad
context.68

61. Miltenberger v. Logansport, C. & S.W. R. Co., 106 U.S. 286, 311–12 (1882).
62. Jeffrey N. Pomerantz, The Bare Necessities of Critical Vendor Motions-It’s a Jungle Out
There, 13 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 73 (2004) (citing Miltenberger, 106 U.S. 286).
63. See Eisenberg & Gecker, supra note 38, at 3.
64. Dudley v. Mealey, 147 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1945); see generally Pomerantz, supra note 62;
Resnick, supra note 33, at 188.
65. The Six Months Rule granted administrative priority status to certain expenses within six
months of receiver appointment. The rule was later codified in § 77(b) of the Bankruptcy Act and
later in § 1171(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. See Gilday, supra note 57, at 426–27; Pomerantz,
supra note 62; 11 U.S.C. § 1171(b) (2006).
66. Dudley, 147 F.2d at 271.
67. Id.
68. See, e.g., In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 98 B.R. 174 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989); In re EaglePicher Indus., Inc., 124 B.R. 1021, 1023 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1991); Resnick, supra note 33, at 188.
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B. HOW THE DOCTRINE IS APPLIED TODAY: THREE APPROACHES
1. Liberal Application
The tendency of courts to utilize the doctrine of necessity varies
drastically by jurisdiction.69 Courts that have been more inclined to grant
critical vendor motions for the payment of pre-petition claims have been
referred to as “debtor friendly.”70 Debtor-friendly courts include the Second
and Third Circuits, which notably encompass the Southern District of New
York and the District of Delaware.71 Despite the presence of the word
“necessity” in the name of the doctrine, debtor-friendly courts grant critical
vendor motions quite frequently.72 The grant of critical vendor pre-petition
claims73 is justified by its tendency to maximize the value of the business,
which increases the total assets and income that will be distributed to all
creditors.
Some courts have derived their authority from the equitable power of
§ 105(a), which states “the court may issue any order, process, or judgment
that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title[]” in
conjunction with the doctrine of necessity.74 These courts have interpreted
§ 105(a) very broadly. They reason that payment of pre-petition claims is
warranted because it is necessary and consistent with the general policy

69. See Eisenberg & Gecker, supra note 38, at 27–37; Resnick, supra note 33, at 189–203.
70. See, e.g., In re Just For Feet, Inc., 242 B.R. 821 (D. Del. 1999); Mich. Bureau of Workers
Disability Comp. v. Chateaugay Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 80 B.R. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); In
re Wehrenberg, Inc., 260 B.R. 468 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 2001); see also Bruce H. White, William L.
Medfort & Patton Boggs, The Doctrine of Necessity and Critical Trade Vendors: The
Impracticality of Maintaining Post-Petition Business Relations in Mega-Cases, 21 AM. BANKR.
INST. J. 24, 24 (2002).
71. See, e.g., In re Ionosphere, 98 B.R. at 179 (approving the debtor’s payment of pre-petition
salaries and benefits to active employees); In re Lehigh & New Eng. Ry. Co., 657 F.2d 570, 581
(3d Cir. 1981) (stating that payment of a claim arising before reorganization is authorized if it is
“essential to the continued operation of the [debtor]”); In re Columbia Gas Sys., Inc., 171 B.R.
189, 192 (Bankr. D. Del. 1994) (noting that in the Third Circuit, a debtor may pay pre-petition
creditors “in advance of a confirmed plan,” where such payments are “essential to the continued
operation of the [debtor’s] business”); In re Fin. News Network, Inc., 134 B.R. 732, 735–36
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991) (observing that “[t]he ‘doctrine of necessity’ stands for the principle that a
bankruptcy court may allow pre-plan payments of prepetition obligations where such payments
are critical to the debtor’s reorganization”). See also In re Payless Cashways, Inc., 268 B.R. 543,
544 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2001); In re Just For Feet, Inc., 242 B.R. at 821; In re Chateaugay Corp.,
80 B.R. at 279; In re United Am., Inc., 327 B.R. 776, 781 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2005); In re NVR
L.P., 147 B.R. 126, 127 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1992).
72. See White, Medfort & Boggs, supra note 70, at 24; Harrison & Drew, supra note 36, at
348.
73. Critical vendor motions are usually made with the other first day motions, in which a
debtor will petition the bankruptcy court to allow certain pre-petition claims to be paid. JEFFREY
T. FERRIELL & EDWARD J. JANGER, UNDERSTANDING BANKRUPTCY 725–26 (2d ed. 2007).
74. See 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2006); White, Medfort & Boggs, supra note 70, at 24. See
generally In re Just for Feet, Inc., 242 B.R. 821; In re Wehrenberg, 260 B.R. 468.
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goals of bankruptcy, such as debtor rehabilitation,75 preservation of the
going-concern value,76 and maximization of value of the debtor.77
Other courts have held that applying the doctrine under § 105(a) alone
is not sufficient to support critical vendor motions, and consequently, have
derived their powers from other provisions of the Code. The bankruptcy
court in In re Payless Cashways found support for pre-petition payments
under both §§ 364(b) and 549 of the Code.78 The court granted the debtor
the authority to pay pre-petition claims of its lumber suppliers on the basis
that they were “critical to the continued operation of the debtor . . . .”79 The
court affirmed that § 364(b) “grants the Court broad authority, at the outset
of a case, to approve borrowing arrangements that are found to be in the
best interests of the debtor, its estate, and its creditors.”80 The Payless court
went on to recognize that it should follow the priorities established in § 507
of the Code; however, the Code permits the court “some limited power to
authorize preferential treatment to certain creditors.”81 Since the debtor
failed to secure post-petition financing, the court found that the granting of
preferential treatment was the only way vendors who were critical to the
debtor’s restructuring would continue to supply goods.82
In addition, other courts have suggested that pre-petition payments may
be justified under § 363(b) of the Code, which allows the trustee to “use,
sell, or lease, other than in the ordinary course of business, property of the
estate” of the debtor.83 Section 363(b) gives the court the authority and
flexibility to craft solutions in various situations, including the payment for
certain pre-petition claims.84
Liberally granting critical vendor motions is not without its drawbacks.
Payment of pre-petition claims invariably will reduce the cash reserves of
the debtor. Therefore, if a company cannot adequately reorganize and is
75. In re Wehrenberg, 260 B.R. at 469.
76. The going-concern value means that a business will continue to operate for the foreseeable
future and will be able to realize assets and discharge liabilities in the normal course of operations.
This concept occurs under the Code when the value of the business’s assets exceeds the value the
business would receive in a Chapter 7 liquidation. The ultimate goal is that business will continue
to operate in order to preserve the going concern. See Harvey R. Miller & Shai Y. Waisman, Does
Chapter 11 Reorganization Remain a Viable Option for Distressed Businesses for the TwentyFirst Century?, 78 AM. BANKR. L.J. 153, 164–66 (2004).
77. In re Wehrenberg, 260 B.R. at 469.
78. In re Payless Cashways, Inc., 268 B.R. 543, 546–47 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2001).
79. Id. at 544.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 546. Under the Code, a trustee may avoid the transfer of property of the estate that
occurs post-petition. 11 U.S.C. § 549 (2006).
82. In re Payless, 268 B.R. at 547.
83. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b). See also In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 98 B.R. 175, 175 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1989); In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d 1063, 1069 (2d Cir. 1983); In re Kmart Corp., 359
F.3d 866, 872 (7th Cir. 2004) (leaving open the possibility that pre-petition payments may be
allowed under § 363(b)(1), which does the least damage to the Code’s priorities).
84. In re Lionel, 722 F.2d at 1069; In re Ionosphere, 98 B.R. at 175.
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forced to liquidate, less cash, if any, will be available for distribution to the
secured and unsecured creditors. Furthermore, it is typically the debtor that
petitions the court to grant their critical vendor motions, which has elicited
criticism in that the debtor will select certain creditors based on favoritism,
and not necessity. If creditors believe that they will be paid so long as the
debtor petitions the court, creditors will be less inclined to take adequate
precautions. Thus, the consequential lack of monitoring risk exposure will
increase moral hazard among creditors.
2. Prohibition of the Doctrine
In contrast to the liberal application, some courts reject or drastically
limit the use of the doctrine of necessity.85 These courts find that the
doctrine contradicts the overarching bankruptcy principle that creditors of
the same class are not to be treated dissimilarly.86 Under the Code,
unsecured claims are paid in accordance with their respective priority
position under § 507, and claims that are at the same priority level are
entitled to the same treatment.87 Thus, the doctrine of necessity operates as
an exception to the general claims priority rule.88 Critics of the doctrine’s
use argue that the Code is clear on the types of claims that are entitled to a
certain status in the priority scheme. They also argue that judges do not
have “free-floating discretion to redistribute rights in accordance with
[their] personal views of justice and fairness . . . .”89 The importance of
strictly adhering to § 507 is to create a transparent and predictable system
for creditors that decide to engage in or continue business with the debtor.90
Some courts also refuse to apply the doctrine because it is difficult for
judges to determine which creditors are necessary.91 Critical vendor
motions typically accompany all other emergency requests for payment on
the first day the petition is filed.92 These courts argue that the “doomsday
scenario”93 described by debtors in these motions and the expedited first
day procedure prompt debtor-friendly courts94 to grant motions without an

85. See Official Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Mabey, 832 F.2d 299, 302 (4th Cir. 1987);
In re Chi., Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co., 791 F.2d 524, 528 (7th Cir. 1986).
86. See In re Chi., 791 F.2d at 528.
87. 11 U.S.C. § 507. See also Jo Ann J. Brighton, The Doctrine of Necessity: Is it Really
Necessary?, 10 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 107, 108 (2000); Bruce S. Nathan, Critical Vendors:
Elevating the Low-Priority Unsecured Claims of Pre-Petition Trade Creditors, 21 AM. BANKR.
INST. J. 14, 14 (2002).
88. Nathan, supra note 87, at 14.
89. See In re Chi., 791 F.2d at 528.
90. See Resnick, supra note 33, at 184.
91. See Harrison & Drew, supra note 36, at 344–46.
92. FERRIELL & JANGER, supra note 73, at 725–26.
93. See Gilday, supra note 57, at 416.
94. See, e.g., In re Just For Feet, Inc., 242 B.R. 821 (D. Del. 1999); Mich. Bureau of Workers
Disability Comp. v. Chateaugay Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 80 B.R. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); In
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in-depth analysis of whether the creditors are in fact essential to the health
of the debtor.95
Furthermore, granting critical vendor motions may not give adequate
notice of pre-petition payment to the debtor’s other creditors.96 Generally,
all interested parties in a bankruptcy proceeding will receive notice, which
affords them an opportunity to object.97 Yet granting certain vendor
motions on the first day, before a hearing, may violate a creditor’s right to
due process.98
Although a bright-line rule rejecting the doctrine provides clarity to the
bankruptcy proceedings, the outright denial of pre-petition payments is not
without its disadvantages. Prohibiting pre-petition payments could prevent
the company from continuing its operations, thereby reducing the total
value of the assets or forcing a “fire sale” of the assets. Furthermore, the
prohibition of payment could have systemic consequences. For example,
certain creditors, most likely trade creditors, will face financial difficulties
and possibly fail if pre-petition payment is not made.99 One reason for
failure is that the debtor could be the largest account for the trade vendor
and thus, if the vendor is not paid, a majority of its revenue will be lost.100
In addition, certain debtors not only require pre-petition payments to
sustain their business, but also post-petition financing or debtor-inpossession (DIP) financing.101 Typically, if a debtor files for a Chapter 11
reorganization, it secures DIP financing in order to make post-petition
payments and continues running the business. A majority of the time, the
creditors that extend DIP financing are the same unsecured creditors that
are seeking pre-petition payment. Eliminating the doctrine could prevent
unsecured creditors from financing the post-petition debt altogether, forcing
the debtor into a liquidation proceeding. This in turn may inhibit the
realization of full asset value. The prohibition of the doctrine by these
courts is an overly conservative restriction to the exercise of judicial
discretion, which may create unnecessary and deleterious consequences to
all creditors.

re CoServ, L.L.C., 273 B.R. 487 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002); In re Wehrenberg, Inc., 260 B.R. 468
(Bankr. E.D. Mo. 2001); see also White, Medfort & Boggs, supra note 70, at 24.
95. See Gilday, supra note 57, at 419.
96. See Brighton, supra note 87, at 115.
97. See id.
98. See id.; Harrison & Drew, supra note 36, at 337.
99. See Gilday, supra note 57, at 420.
100. See id.; In re CoServ, L.L.C., 273 B.R. 487, 499–500 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002).
101. DIP financing under Chapter 11 of the Code allows debtors of a failing company access to
secure proceeds, enabling the continuation of the business. To entice creditors to lend to a
distressed company, DIP financing lenders receive super-priority status over all other debt, and
equity claims. 11 U.S.C. § 364 (2006).
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3. Striking the Correct Balance
Contrary to the all-or-nothing approaches used by some courts, other
courts have attempted to strike a balance by implementing tests for
determining such critical vendors.102 These courts have recognized the need
for certain pre-petition payments, but have also exercised caution in
determining which claims should receive critical vendor status.
One of the most prominent cases where the court correctly balanced
critical vendor motions was In re Kmart Corp.103 In Kmart, the Seventh
Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of orders that allowed the debtor,
Kmart, to pay pre-petition claims of certain alleged critical vendors and
suppliers before confirmation of the debtor’s Chapter 11 plan of
reorganization.104 It did not, however, affirm the district court’s reasoning
or the per se prohibition of critical vendor motions in general.105
In the initial bankruptcy proceeding, the bankruptcy court had granted
pre-petition payments, which totaled approximately $300 million to 2,330
critical vendors, while approximately 2,000 other vendors were deemed not
critical, and over 43,000 additional unsecured creditors were denied any
pre-petition payment.106 The district court reversed the bankruptcy court’s
order authorizing payment, “conclud[ing] that neither § 105(a) nor a ‘doctrine of necessity’ supports the orders.”107 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit
articulated that the bankruptcy court failed to explain or justify any basis for
granting the critical vendor motions.108 In order to prove the vendor was
necessary, the bankruptcy court should have shown that disfavored creditors would have received more in a reorganization than in a liquidation, and
“that the supposedly critical vendors would have ceased deliveries if old
debts were left unpaid . . . .”109 The Seventh Circuit alluded to alternative
options that were available to Kmart, which the bankruptcy court failed to
address.110 For instance, the bankruptcy court neglected the option of using
a letter of credit to assure payment, failed to find that vendors would discontinue business with Kmart absent payment, failed to determine that dissimilar treatment of unsecured creditors was necessary for reorganization,
and failed to show that disfavored creditors were in at least the same position but for the orders.111 In addition, the Seventh Circuit noted that some
creditors should have been excluded from pre-petition payment because
102.
103.
104.
105.

See, e.g., In re CoServ, 273 B.R. 487; In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866 (7th Cir. 2004).
See In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866.
See id. at 867.
The court left open the possibility of a critical vendor motion under § 363(b)(1) by
refusing to address the issue since this particular order was unsound for its application. See id. at
872.
106. See id. at 869.
107. Id.
108. See id. at 867.
109. Id. at 873.
110. Id. at 873–74.
111. Id.
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they were already contractually obligated112 to continue doing business with
the debtor company; thus, pre-petition payment was unnecessary.113
Although the Seventh Circuit called the doctrine of necessity “just a
fancy name for a power to depart from the Code[,]” it did not reject the
principle of pre-petition payment of critical vendors entirely.114 The court
left open the possibility of a pre-petition payment to a critical vendor under
§ 363(b)(1) of the Code.115 It considered § 363(b)(1) to be the most
promising justification for granting critical vendor orders, reasoning that the
payment of pre-petition debt was warranted “in order to keep ‘critical’
supplies flowing” and “is a use of property other than in the ordinary course
of [business] . . . .”116
The Seventh Circuit articulated a balance between a “per se
prohibition” and a frequently exercised grant of pre-petition payments made
to critical vendors.117 The Kmart standard requires that unsecured creditor
claims not be paid unless it is clear that the creditor will otherwise
discontinue its business relations with the debtor, which would in turn have
a detrimental effect on all creditors. In addition, all other alternatives should
be carefully analyzed before granting the motion. The unfortunate
consequence of this approach is that it will reward those who refuse to
cooperate by paying them first. It appears that under Kmart, noncooperative
creditors are rewarded at the expense of cooperative creditors.
Another court has applied similar reasoning and a strict analysis
regarding critical vendors as the Seventh Circuit in Kmart.118 The
bankruptcy court in In re CoServ, L.L.C. denied the debtor’s motion with
respect to five critical vendors and granted only two.119 The court found
that, in most cases, the alleged critical vendors could be replaced with little
or no harm to the debtor’s going concern. The court held that, in order to
make critical vendor payments, the debtor must show by a preponderance of
evidence that: (1) “it must be critical that the debtor deal with the
claimant”;120 (2) “unless it deals with the claimant, the debtor risks the
possibility of harm, or, alternatively, loss of economic advantage to the
estate or the debtor’s going-concern value, which is disproportionate to the

112. The automatic stay provision under the Code prohibits vendors with contract obligations
from breaching by nonperformance due to the debtor’s failure to pay pre-petition debts. An
automatic stay is an operation of law in that it automatically prevents all creditors from receiving
payment from the debtor until a reorganization plan has been confirmed. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2006);
In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d at 873.
113. In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d at 873.
114. Id. at 871.
115. Id. at 872.
116. Id.
117. See Harrison & Drew, supra note 36, at 348.
118. See, e.g., In re CoServ, L.L.C., 273 B.R. 487 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002).
119. Id. at 499–501.
120. Id. at 498.
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amount of the claimant’s prepetition claim”;121 and (3) “there is no practical
or legal alternative by which the debtor can deal with the claimant other
than by payment of the claim.”122 The CoServ court further recognized that
there may be legal remedies available to the debtor that do not require prepetition payment, but nonetheless alleviate creditors’ concerns.123
Both the CoServ and Kmart courts have established clear factors that
should be addressed when establishing critical vendor status, which will
strike a correct balance between actual necessity and liberal discretion in
granting critical vendor motions. This approach allows for some flexibility
of the courts discretionary authority, but is not an invitation for abuse by
debtors and creditors.
III. DODD-FRANK’S ORDERLY LIQUIDATION AUTHORITY
Under Title II of Dodd-Frank, the FDIC was granted authority to treat
similarly situated creditors differently, so long as it was in furtherance of
the OLA’s objectives. Some of these objectives are specifically mandated
by Title II, and generally by Dodd-Frank. In order to adhere to these
objectives, the FDIC clarified how it intended to treat certain creditors as
expressed in the Final Rule.124 Nevertheless, the FDIC’s failure to set a
standard, for other creditors that were not per se excluded, does not
adequately adhere to the OLA’s mandated objectives as effectively as it
could. Thus, this note proposes a clear standard to address other categories
of creditors not encompassed by the Final Rule, which will accomplish
OLA’s objectives more effectively. To fully understand this note’s
proposal, a brief discussion of the creation of the OLA and its objectives is
necessary.
A. RATIONALE FOR THE ORDERLY LIQUIDATION AUTHORITY
The rationale behind the creation of the OLA was to put in place the
legal mechanisms that were not available before the crisis occurred—
namely, the ability of the federal government to wind down bank holding
companies and nonbank financial companies.125 Before the creation of the
OLA under Dodd-Frank, when a bank holding company or nonbank
financial company became insolvent, the only available option was to file
for protection under the Code as either a liquidation proceeding under

121.
122.
123.
124.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 499.
Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 206, 124 Stat. 1376, 1459 (2010) (codified at 12
U.S.C. § 5386 (2010)); Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,626 (July 15, 2011) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt.
380.27).
125. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 75 Fed. Reg. 64,173, 64,174 (proposed Oct. 19, 2010) (to
be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 380).
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Chapter 7,126 or a reorganization under Chapter 11.127 Opponents of the
Code, including the Treasury Department, however, argued that the
bankruptcy system could not adequately liquidate these large financial
companies.128
The federal government and other commentators have suggested that
the bankruptcy process: is not quick enough, which results in loss of asset
value; lacks competent bankruptcy judges that can handle liquidating a
complex financial company; could potentially cause “rapid runs on shortterm financial instruments” leading to “‘fire sales’ of assets” when the
petition is filed; and most importantly, “has neither the goals nor the
mechanisms to take externalities such as effects on outside parties or the
financial system into account.”129 In support of the position that the Code
was an inefficient way to handle the liquidation of these large financial
companies, critics point to deleterious effects that occurred subsequent to
the bankruptcy filing of Lehman Brothers.130
Contrary to previous measures taken by the federal government to
prevent failure, such as injecting capital, as they did with Bear Sterns, the
federal government let Lehman Brothers fail.131 Lehman Brothers filed for
Chapter 11 protection on September 15, 2008, creating the largest
bankruptcy in U.S. history.132 The events that took place after the collapse
of Lehman Brothers were nothing short of earth-shattering.133 The credit
market froze in the United States, banks halted lending, consumer and car
loans were impossible to obtain, and businesses could not obtain credit to
meet employee payrolls.134 As a consequence, there was a 6 percent decline
126. 11 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (2006).
127. 11 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq.; see also Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 75 Fed. Reg. at 64,174
(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 380); see generally Systemically Important Institutions, supra note
25.
128. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Testimony before
the Comm. Fin. Servs.: Lessons from the Failure of Lehman Brothers (Apr. 20, 2010), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/bernanke20100420a.htm.
129. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., STUDY ON THE RESOLUTION OF
FINANCIAL COMPANIES UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY CODE 7 (2011) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter
STUDY UNDER BANKRUPTCY CODE].
130. Id.
131. Sorkin & Thomas, supra note 5.
132. See The Orderly Liquidation of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. Under the Dodd-Frank
Act, 5 FDIC QUARTERLY 1, 1 (2011) [hereinafter Orderly Liquidation of Lehman Brothers].
133. The Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy filing has been noted as “one of the signal events of the
financial crisis.” In addition, the Dow Jones declined over 500 points, which was the largest
single-day drop since the terrorist attacks on September 11th, and credit markets showed distress.
See id.; Alex Berenson, Wall St.’s Turmoil Sends Stocks Reeling, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/16/business/worldbusiness/16markets.html?hp;
Simon
Kennedy, Greg Morcroft & Robert Schroeder, Lehman Failure, AIG Struggle Drive Financials
Lower, MARKETWATCH (Sept. 15, 2008, 4:48 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/Story
/story/print?guid=8E886D48-E3C7-4CE2-95F4-7099CE1A49DB.
134. Matthew Jaffe, Lessons to Be Learned One Year After Lehman Brothers Collapse Roiled
the World, ABC NEWS (Sept. 14, 2009), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/lessons-learned-yearfinancial-crisis-began/story?id=8563814; Fareed Zakaria, A Lonely Success: Don’t Forget: the

2011]

Are Certain Creditors Too Big (or Important) to Fail

279

in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and 1.7 million people lost their jobs
in one quarter, the largest drop in employment in sixty-five years.135 The
following day, Barclays announced an agreement to purchase Lehman
Brothers’ North American investment banking and trading divisions along
with its New York headquarters building, subject to regulatory approval.136
On September 20, 2008, a revised version of that agreement was approved
by U.S. Bankruptcy Judge James M. Peck through a § 363 sale under the
Code.137
In contrast to the federal government’s position, other commentators
argued that the bankruptcy process was the most effective and efficient way
to unwind these large financial companies.138 They proposed that instead of
a new insolvency regime, an additional section should be added to the Code
that would specifically handle bank holding companies and nonbank
financial companies.139 The proponents of the bankruptcy process argued
that the Code “provides legal certainty, offering a large body of established
jurisprudence,” predictability which encourages “risk-monitoring measures
by creditors” thereby “reduc[ing] . . . moral hazard and . . . increas[ing] . . .
market discipline,” a process for the “viability of an insolvent firm,” and
“judicial review.”140
Even with strong opposition to the creation of the OLA, the federal
government viewed Lehman Brothers’ failure as an example of the
inadequacies of the bankruptcy system.141 The crippling effects of the
Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy on the financial system appeared to solidify
the Treasury Department’s opposition to the possibility of bankruptcy
reform.142 The Treasury Department’s position was that bankruptcy
proceedings would likely be too slow to respond, and a resolution regime
must be more responsive.143 Following the Treasury Department’s position,
Congress rejected bankruptcy reform, and instead established the OLA to
wind down these institutions under Title II of Dodd-Frank.144

Bailouts Worked., NEWSWEEK, Sept. 19, 2010, http://www.newsweek.com/2010/09/19/zakariadon-t-forget-that-the-bailouts-worked.html.
135. Zakaria, supra note 134.
136. Barclays Buys Core Lehman Assets, supra note 6.
137. See Judge Approves $1.3bn Lehman Deal, BBC NEWS, Sept. 20, 2008, http://news.bbc.co
.uk/2/hi/business/7626624.stm.
138. STUDY UNDER BANKRUPTCY CODE, supra note 129, at 5.
139. See John B. Taylor, How to Avoid a “Bailout Bill,” WALL ST. J., May 3, 2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703871904575216633061219378.html.
140. STUDY UNDER BANKRUPTCY CODE, supra note 129, at 6 (footnote omitted).
141. See Orderly Liquidation of Lehman Brothers, supra note 132, at 18–19; Press Release,
U.S. Dept. of Treas., Treasury Proposes Legislation for Resolution Authority (Mar. 25, 2009),
available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg70.aspx.
142. Treasury Proposes Legislation for Resolution Authority, supra note 141.
143. Id.
144. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 204, 124 Stat. 1376, 1454 (2010) (codified at 12
U.S.C. § 5384 (2010)).
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B. PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES OF THE ORDERLY LIQUIDATION
AUTHORITY
Section 204 of Title II states that the purpose of the OLA is “to provide
the necessary authority to liquidate failing financial companies that pose a
significant risk to the financial stability of the United States in a manner
that mitigates such risk and minimizes moral hazard.”145 Furthermore, the
authority will be exercised in a manner whereby creditors, shareholders, and
management “bear losses consistent with their responsibility, including
actions for damages, restitution, and recoupment of compensation and other
gains not compatible with such responsibility.”146
Although §§ 204 and 206 are substantially similar, § 206 is slightly
more detailed. Section 206 stipulates six mandatory terms and conditions
for all orderly liquidation actions. First, it mandates that the FDIC will only
take action for the financial stability of the United States, and not to bail out
or rescue a particular failing financial company.147 Second, shareholders
will be the last to receive payment after all other claims have been paid.148
Third, unsecured creditors’ losses and payments, if any, will be made in
accordance with the mandated priority provisions in § 210.149 Fourth, the
FDIC, as receiver, will remove management of the failing financial
company.150 Fifth, the FDIC will remove the board of directors of the
failing financial company.151 Sixth, the FDIC cannot take an equity interest
in or become a shareholder of a failing financial company. This provision
was included to prevent another TBTF bailout.152
In addition to the specific objectives set forth under Title II, there are
general overarching goals of Dodd-Frank as well. The opening preamble of
Dodd-Frank legislation states that it was enacted “[t]o promote the financial
stability of the United States by improving accountability and transparency
in the financial system, to end ‘too big to fail’, to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for other purposes.”153
C. THE FDIC’S POWERS AND DUTIES AS RECEIVER
As receiver, the FDIC will have many powers to effectuate the goals of
the OLA, including the ability to: “take over the assets of and operate the . .
. [failing] company with all of the powers of the members or shareholders,

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id. § 204(a).
Id.
Id. § 206(1).
Id. § 206(2).
Id. § 206(3).
Id. § 206(4).
Id. § 206(5).
Id. § 206(6).
Id. pmbl.
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the directors, and the officers”;154 “collect all obligations and money
owed”;155 “perform all functions of the covered financial company”;156
“manage the assets and property” as to maximize asset value;157 and
“provide by contract for assistance in fulfilling any function, activity,
action, or duty of the [FDIC] as receiver.”158 The broad nature of these
powers enables the FDIC to exercise wide discretion as to the managing
and winding down of these financial companies.159
These provisions are similar to certain provisions found in the FDIA.160
Under the FDIA, the FDIC has the authority to continue operations after the
closing of a failed depository institution if necessary to maximize the value
of the assets in order to achieve the “least costly”161 resolution, or if
necessary to prevent “serious adverse effects on economic conditions or
financial stability.”162 Under the least costly requirement, other institutions
will pay a premium to acquire the failed bank in order to obtain the
sustained depositor relationships, thereby maximizing recoveries and
minimizing losses.163
In order to accomplish the OLA’s objectives, Dodd-Frank empowers
the FDIC to treat creditors of the same class differently. Yet, the ability to
treat creditors in the same class differently raises substantially the same
concerns as the doctrine of necessity does in bankruptcy.164 To address
similar concerns and minimize public uncertainty, the FDIC has sought to
create more transparency, and used its authority under § 209 to promulgate
a rule that would clarify the categories of creditors to which it may
authorize additional payments;165 however, as this note points out, the FDIC
did not go far enough.166

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id. § 210(a)(1)(B)(i).
Id. § 210(a)(1)(B)(ii).
Id. § 210(a)(1)(B)(iii).
Id. § 210(a)(1)(B)(iv).
Id. § 210(a)(1)(B)(v).
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 75 Fed. Reg. 64,173, 64,174–75 (proposed Oct. 19, 2010)
(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 380).
160. Id. at 64,175.
161. The “least costly” approach requires the FDIC to determine that its exercise of authority is
necessary and the total amount of expenditures and obligations taken on by the FDIC to be as
inexpensive as possible. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4) (2006); Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 75 Fed.
Reg. at 64,177 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 380).
162. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 75 Fed. Reg. at 64,177 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt.
380) (citing 12 U.S.C. §§ 1821(d), 1823(c)).
163. Id. at 64,177.
164. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 210(b)(1), (b)(4), 124 Stat. 1376, 1475, 1476
(2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5390 (2010)); Letter from Comm. on Capital Mkts. Reg. to Robert
E. Feldman, Exec. Sec’y, supra note 49.
165. Dodd-Frank Act § 209, 124 Stat. 1460 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5380).
166. See id. § 204(a).
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IV. CRITIQUE OF THE FDIC’S DECLARED TREATMENT OF
CERTAIN UNSECURED CREDITORS
The Final Rule excludes many types of unsecured creditors from
receiving additional payments.167 As such, it distinguishes long-term
unsecured debt from short-term unsecured debt, with the former being
excluded.168 The FDIC did not exclude short-term debt creditors, such as
commercial lenders, because those creditors can provide lines of credit and
other forms of financing to the failing financial company. This financing
can be critical to the company’s interim operation and orderly liquidation.169
The FDIC can enforce lines of credit and agree to repay the lender under the
credit agreement.170 Furthermore, lines of credit can be essential to help
reduce funding requests from the Orderly Liquidation Fund (the Fund).171
In addition, by distinguishing between long-term and short-term debt,
the Final Rule seeks to achieve the goals of Dodd-Frank by creating more
transparency to current and future creditors of potential failing financial
companies, and maximizing asset value.172 Allocating additional payments
to certain creditors that are critical to the business operation will allow the
business to continue to the benefit of all creditors. Allowing the business to
operate and continue provides the FDIC with the opportunity to wind down
the business or sell certain assets of the company. A structured sale of an
ongoing business would allow creditors, favored and disfavored, to receive
more than they would in a Chapter 7 liquidation or a “fire sale” of assets
that do not necessarily recover the going-concern value.
Furthermore, long-term creditors are in a position to impose market
discipline on a financial company.173 “[T]hese creditors do not share in the
potential profits gained from engaging in risky activities,” and cannot “exit
167. See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 75 Fed. Reg. at 64,177 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt.
380); Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,626, 41,644 (July 15, 2011) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 380.27).
168. See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 75 Fed. Reg. at 64,177 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt.
380); Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 41,634 (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 380.27).
169. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 75 Fed. Reg. at 64,177–78 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt.
380).
170. Dodd-Frank Act § 210(c)(13)(D), 124 Stat. 1493 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5390); Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 75 Fed. Reg. at 64,178 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 380).
171. Dodd-Frank established an “Orderly Liquidation Fund” in the Treasury that is available to
the FDIC in connection with its receivership operations under the Act. Upon appointment as a
receiver, the FDIC is authorized to issue obligations to the Treasury Secretary (i.e., borrow from
the Treasury Department). The FDIC’s issuance of obligations in connection with the liquidation
of a failing financial company may not exceed: (i) “10 percent of the total consolidated assets”
and (ii) “90 percent of the fair value of the total consolidated assets of each . . . company that are
available for repayment. . . .” Dodd-Frank Act § 210(n)(6)(A), (B), 124 Stat. 1507 (codified at 12
U.S.C. § 5390); see also Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 75 Fed. Reg. at 64,178 (to be codified at
12 C.F.R. pt. 380).
172. See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 75 Fed. Reg. at 64,177 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt.
380).
173. See Alison M. Hashmall, Note, After the Fall: A New Framework to Regulate “Too Big to
Fail” Non-bank Financial Institutions, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 829, 842 (2010).
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quickly” if the company fails.174 Thus, they are incentivized to prefer more
conservative investments.175
In contrast, short-term creditors are more likely to engage in risky
practices.176 This risky behavior has the ability to pose a significant threat to
the financial system, while exacerbating moral hazard among short-term
creditors if it remains unchecked.177 For example, in the financial context,
moral hazard refers to the risk that creditors, shareholders, or investors of
large financial institutions will take fewer precautions because they know
they will be rescued or bailed out by the government.178 Having fewer
precautions leads to risky behavior, which can lead to a systemic problem.
In order to prevent systemic risk, however, regulators may need to rescue
short-term creditors in order to prevent multiple failures throughout the
market.179 Therefore, a government response “may contribute to the exact
instability that government backing is trying to prevent.”180 While this note
does not dispute the need to provide additional payments to creditors, which
are necessary to the failing financial company, it does dispute the FDIC’s
decision not to provide any framework or structure as to its exercise of
discretion with regard to short-term creditors. Implementing a standard will
convey a message to short-term creditors that the FDIC is unlikely to use its
discretion unless it is of the utmost necessity. This will have the effect of
reducing moral hazard, while still permitting the FDIC the ability to use its
discretion in the event that systemic risk is a possibility.
V. RECOMMENDATION
Although the Final Rule is a step in the right direction by the FDIC to
elucidate the categories of creditors that will be excluded from additional
payments, it falls short, and further clarification is needed. The Final Rule
failed to address how the FDIC will use its discretionary power regarding
additional payments to short-term creditors, or creditors that were not
automatically excluded.181 In the absence of any standard, the FDIC still has
authority to exercise wide discretion to treat short-term creditors
dissimilarly.182 This discretion presents the same dilemma that courts have
debated when applying the doctrine of necessity: how is a critical vendor
distinguishable from other creditors?
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

See id. at 842.
See id.
See id. at 843.
See id.
Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 16, at 485.
Hashmall, supra note 173, at 842–43.
Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 16, at 486.
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 75 Fed. Reg. 64,173, 64,174–75 (proposed Oct. 19, 2010)
(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 380); Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,626, 41,644 (July 15, 2011)
(codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 380.27).
182. See FDIC’s New Power, supra note 26.
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It is this note’s position that adopting a clear standard to determine a
short-term creditor’s necessity will not only comply with the OLA’s stated
objectives in a more effective manner, but will also allow the FDIC
flexibility. The standards set forth in Kmart and CoServ present the optimal
balance. In Kmart, the court highlighted essential factors that must be
shown before a critical vendor payment may be allocated.183 First, the
disfavored creditors will benefit from the payment of favored creditors
because it will allow the business to continue; and second, the supposedly
critical vendors would cease deliveries or supplies if pre-petition debt is not
paid.184 Adopting similar reasoning, in CoServ, the court adopted a threepronged test that creates a clear standard which critical vendors must meet,
including demonstrating the creditor’s indispensability to the debtor, the
probable realization of economic gain, and a lack of practical
alternatives.185
Therefore, this note recommends the following standard be met before
additional payment to a short-term creditor is made. First, the creditor must
be virtually indispensible to the profitable operations or preservation of the
value of the assets. Second, the creditor would discontinue business with
the failing financial company if no additional payment is made. Third,
creditor payment should either further the objectives of the OLA to
maximize value or prevent serious economic harm to the distressed
company. Lastly, no other practical alternatives are available other than
payment to the certain creditor.
This note’s standard in conjunction with the FDIC’s Final Rule will
accomplish the mandated objectives of the OLA in the most effective
manner for several reasons. First, the proposed standard is in accordance
with the FDIC’s stated intent that the dissimilar treatment of creditors will
only be exercised when it is necessary to maximize asset value.186 Only on a
“case-by-case basis” will the payment of creditors be made, and in
accordance with all statutory requirements.187 Implementing a standard to
distinguish the necessary unsecured creditors from other unsecured
creditors will accomplish this goal more effectively. By applying the
proposed standard, it will further narrow the possibility of granting
additional payments to creditors that are not necessary to maximize the
value of the assets.
Second, the implementation of a clear standard will create more
transparency in the liquidation process, an overarching objective of the

183.
184.
185.
186.

See In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866, 872 (7th Cir. 2004).
See id.
In re CoServ, L.L.C., 273 B.R. 487, 498 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002).
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 75 Fed. Reg. at 64,177–78 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt.

380).

187. Id. at 64,178.
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legislation.188 In addition, it may alleviate concerns regarding the political
aptitude of those exercising discretion and the administration that is in
office at the time.
Third, this note’s proposed standard will minimize moral hazard more
effectively than the FDIC’s Final Rule. Without any clear standard that
addresses the FDIC’s reluctance to grant additional payments to short-term
creditors, these creditors may still engage in risky practices. If the proposed
standard is implemented, however, they will be on notice that the FDIC’s
authority will only be exercised in extreme cases. Thus, a rational creditor
would not anticipate additional payments, and it would reduce moral
hazard. Furthermore, putting forth a standard by which the FDIC will
operate sends a strong message to the marketplace that additional payments
will be a drastic measure, and not made regularly. This can reduce moral
hazard and risk taking as well. One can argue that the recent downgrade by
Moody’s of the long-term credit of Citigroup, Inc., Wells Fargo & Co., and
Bank of America Corp. was an example of the effects that Dodd-Frank and
FDIC regulations can have on the marketplace.189 Moody’s downgraded
these banks because of an increased possibility that the government would
allow these large financial institutions to fail, taking the view that contagion
could be limited.190 The credit downgrade signifies that the anti-bailout
position embraced under Dodd-Frank has affected at least one credit
agency’s view as to the level of risk associated within these institutions.191
A riskier investment is usually accompanied by increased costs, which can
affect how other parties in the market interact with a specific company.192
Although this note’s standard applies in most instances, there may be a
limitation for a certain type of creditor that should be noted. Generally, under the Code, contractual agreements that include provisions which allow a
party to terminate the contract upon a debtor filing for bankruptcy or some
other event related to the debtor’s financial condition are not enforceable
and subject to the automatic stay.193 One exception to this rule is for a
“qualified financial contract” (QFC), which is “any securities contract,
commodity contract, forward contract, repurchase agreement, swap agree188. U.S. S. COMM. ON BANKING, HOUS. & URBAN AFFAIRS, BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE DODDFRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT (2010), available at
http://banking.senate.gov/public/_files/070110_Dodd_Frank_Wall_Street_Reform_comprehensiv
e_summary_Final.pdf.
189. See Hugh Son, Dakin Campbell & Donal Griffin, BofA, Wells Fargo Downgraded by
Moody’s, BLOOMBERG, Sept. 21, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-09-21/bank-ofamerica-credit-rating-downgraded-by-moody-s-on-waning-u-s-support.html; Joe Rauch & David
Henry, Moody’s Downgrades Big Banks on Changed Policy, REUTERS, Sept. 21, 2011,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/22/us-bankofamerica-downgrade-idUSTRE78K4P020110
922.
190. Son, Campbell & Griffin, supra note 189; Rauch & Henry, supra note 189.
191. Son, Campbell & Griffin, supra note 189; Rauch & Henry, supra note 189.
192. Son, Campbell & Griffin, supra note 189; Rauch & Henry, supra note 189.
193. 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(1)(B) (2006); FERRIELL & JANGER, supra note 73, at 236–37.
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ment, and any similar agreement.”194 Due to this exception, in a bankruptcy
proceeding, a “non-defaulting QFC counterparty” can “close out, terminate,
[or] net” their position, whether the trustee approves or not.195 The rationale
for the QFC exception can be attributed to concerns over systemic risk and
market uncertainty, thereby creating liquidity issues and contagion effects
on the economy.196 Many large financial institutions (e.g., Lehman Brothers) that invest heavily in “certain specialized markets for financial assets”
have extensive QFC exposure.197 The deleterious consequence of this was
exemplified when Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy, and most of the
counterparties to the QFCs terminated their contracts immediately upon the
bankruptcy filing.198 Those terminations resulted in the loss of billions of
dollars in market value to the bankruptcy estate almost instantaneously.199
Although the QFC exemption was intended to prevent systemic risk, some
commentators have argued that it actually increased systemic risk.200 They
contend that the exemption alters the incentives so that counterparties do
not monitor or impose discipline on the debtor, creating “counterparty runs”
that have “spillover effects” on other creditors and the market as a whole.201
In order to rectify this detrimental effect, Title II imposes a onebusiness-day delay on all QFC terminations by counterparties.202 The purpose of the one-business-day delay is to allow the FDIC to transfer assets,
contracts, and other property of the failing company to another solvent
company or to a newly created bridge financial company.203 By transferring
the assets, counterparties cannot terminate their positions or contracts due to
insolvency of the failing company as they did in the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy.204 This prohibition is intended to provide “market certainty and stability” and, in the event of sale to a third party, “preserves the value
represented by the contracts.”205
In the event that the FDIC does not transfer assets of the failing financial company to either a third-party purchaser or a bridge financial company, this note’s standard would be inapplicable. For instance, if neither transfer happens within the one-business-day delay period, the “non-defaulting
QFC counterparty . . . can take actions to exercise its contractual rights,” as
194. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 210(c)(8)(D)(i), 124 Stat. 1376, 1482 (2010)
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5390 (2010)).
195. STUDY UNDER BANKRUPTCY CODE, supra note 129, at 15.
196. Id. at 17–18.
197. Systemically Important Institutions, supra note 25; Orderly Liquidation of Lehman, supra
note 132, at 8.
198. See Orderly Liquidation of Lehman Brothers, supra note 132, at 3–4.
199. Id.
200. STUDY UNDER BANKRUPTCY CODE, supra note 129, at 16.
201. Id.
202. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 210(c)(10)(B), 124 Stat. 1376, 1491 (2010)
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5390 (2010)).
203. Id. § 210(c)(9); Orderly Liquidation of Lehman Brothers, supra note 132, at 8.
204. Orderly Liquidation of Lehman Brothers, supra note 132, at 8.
205. Id. (footnote omitted).
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it did in Lehman Brothers.206 Therefore, it would not matter whether a standard had existed because the failing financial company would have little or
no value remaining after the QFC counterparty terminates. Despite the possibility that the FDIC could fail to create a bridge company in time to prevent QFC termination or facilitate a transfer to a new purchaser, it is doubtful that this situation would occur. In fact, the FDIC already has this authority under the FDIA, and orchestrated a similar transaction in 2008 with Indy
Mac Bank, as a “pass-through conservatorship.”207
In the likely event that the FDIC does form a bridge financial company,
it could create more than one. For example, the FDIC could transfer all the
assets and other property that can be sold to a third party into one company,
which we shall call the “Good Bridge Company.”208 The FDIC could also
create another bridge company, which we shall call the “Bad Bridge Company,” to which all liabilities and other defaulted obligations that cannot be
sold will be transferred.209 Other possible bridge companies can be formed
to hold all QFCs or other property.
This note’s standard can be an effective mechanism whether the failing
financial company’s property is transferred to the Good or Bad Bridge
Company, but with varying effects. In a Good Bridge Company scenario, a
central concern is to preserve a lasting relationship with a creditor so that
the company can remain intact. Continued operations will have the effect of
facilitating the maximization of asset value when it is sold to a third party.210 Yet, the issue that arises again is: are these creditors in fact necessary?
Since the automatic stay would prohibit the cancellation of certain obligations, exclusive of QFCs, it may not be necessary to make prepayments because the receiver can determine whether to accept or reject certain contracts.211 Even in a Bad Bridge Company scenario, the standard is useful
because it also preserves the relationship of the creditors, especially when
there are no contracts with creditors, but rather an open account relationship. It would still be the goal of the receiver to sell these assets for some
value, and paying certain short-term creditors may be the best way to maximize asset value.212 Thus, a standard to determine the necessity of these
unsecured short-term creditors would still be beneficial and facilitate the
process in either a Good or Bad Bridge Company situation. Furthermore, if
a bridge company is created within the one-business-day delay period, all
QFCs could be transferred, and the FDIC would afford the same discretio-

206. STUDY UNDER BANKRUPTCY CODE, supra note 129, at 15.
207. Orderly Liquidation of Lehman Brothers, supra note 132, at 7 n.39.
208. See Jeffrey N. Gordon & Christopher Muller, Confronting Financial Crisis: Dodd-Frank’s
Dangers and the Case for a Systemic Emergency Insurance Fund, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 151, 185
(2011); Dodd-Frank Act § 210(h), 124 Stat. 1496 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5390).
209. Gordon & Muller, supra note 208, at 185.
210. See id. at 185–86.
211. Dodd-Frank Act § 210(c)(1), 124 Stat. 1477 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5390).
212. See id. § 210(a)(1)(B)(iv).
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nary treatment as it does to the other short-term unsecured creditors. Thus,
this note’s standard would still apply.
CONCLUSION
Under Dodd-Frank, Congress has granted the FDIC wide discretion and
authority as receiver under the OLA.213 In an effort to adhere to the OLA’s
mandated objectives, the FDIC clarified how it would exercise its authority
when granting additional payments to certain creditors over others of the
same class.214 As this note argues, however, the FDIC only addresses half of
the issue by failing to propose a standard that indicates its intended
treatment toward short-term creditors. This note proposed a standard, which
would further clarify the manner in which the FDIC would exercise its
authority to treat short-term creditors differently by incorporating
bankruptcy standards that have proven useful and effective.215
Thus, this note recommends that the FDIC, in conjunction with the
FSOC, propose a rule, which includes this note’s standard to address the
FDIC’s treatment of short-term creditors under the OLA. Creating a clear
standard to determine if a creditor is necessary will have the effect of
promoting transparency within a recently created, and never before used,
liquidation regime, minimizing moral hazard among short-term creditors,
maximizing the assets of the failing financial company, harmonizing the
OLA and existing insolvency regimes, and maintaining FDIC flexibility.216
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213. FDIC’s New Power, supra note 26.
214. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 75 Fed. Reg. 64,173, 64,181 (proposed Oct. 19, 2010) (to
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